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This paper provides an analysis of the two channels of regional integration: integration via markets and integration via agreements. Given that East Asia and Latin America are two fertile regions where both forms of integrations have taken place, the authors examine the experiences of these two areas. There are four related results. First, East Asia had been integrating via markets long before formal agreements were in vogue in the region. Latin America, by contrast, has primarily used formal regional trade treaties as the main channel of integration. Second, despite the relative lack of formal This paper-a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to analyze regional integration and trade policy. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ. worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at fng@worldbank.org. regional trade treaties until recently, East Asia is more integrated among itself than Latin America. Third, from a purely economic and trade standpoint, the proper sequence of integrations seems to be first integrating via markets and subsequently via formal regional trade agreements. Fourth, regional trade agreements often serve multiple constituents. The reason why integrating via markets first can be helpful is because this can give stronger political bargaining power to the outwardlooking economic-oriented forces within the country.
Introduction
During the last decade, we witnessed a major transformation in the global governance of international trade relationships. The first development occurred in 1995 with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is the foremost global institution governing the conduct of international trade. Rules contained in the Uruguay Round which created the World Trade Organization are the most ambitious and comprehensive multilateral trade laws ever ratified by member countries and they provide an anchor and a set of norms for all contracting parties. Paradoxically, parallel to the development of these multilateral rules since 1995 is the second major development in international trade relationships-the proliferation of bilateral, regional and other preferential trade agreements among nations. As the Doha Round of negotiations is currently indefinitely suspended, it is expected that regional and bilateral trade deals will become even more prevalent.
The creation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) such as Free Trade Areas
(FTAs) is by no means new. But the sheer number and the speed with which these agreements have been negotiated in the past ten years are simply astonishing. By 2005, all but one WTO member was trading under one or more PTAs (Limao 2005) . In this paper, we would like to analyze the recent history, characteristics and the political economy of regional and bilateral trade integration from the viewpoint of two core concepts: integration of markets vs.
integration by agreements.
As its name suggests, the concept of integration of markets focuses on the idea that economies can integrate among themselves through the use of the marketplace, i.e. allowing the private sector to be the vanguard of trade integration. This can also be described as regional integration via de facto agreements. More concretely, this means that the economies in a region trade intensively among themselves without explicit formal preferential trade agreements. To facilitate intra-regional trade without the help of regional legal trade agreements, some of the economies may pursue policies of unilateral domestic deregulation and trade liberalizations, while others may improve their infrastructure (such as ports and highways), streamline their custom procedures or pursue policies that may facilitate inward foreign direct investment. In other words, even integration via the markets can entail the use of some business-friendly policies by individual economies, even though no legal regional trade treaties are signed by governments.
The second core concept is integration by agreements, which focuses on trade integration via the use of formal or de jure trade treaties. This channel of integration emphasizes the primacy of legal instruments to further economic integration among countries.
There is no doubt that these two instruments of integration are very much related and indeed ultimately they are complementary. Integration of neighboring markets without formal regional trade agreements can create uncertainty among businesses since the institutional foundations may not be sufficiently clear and transparent. Integration by agreements can be vacuous if the underlying economic factors are not favorable for integration. Nonetheless, it is important to ask the following questions: Which instrument of integration is more successful and more fundamental in driving trade integration? Is there a logical sequence for policymakers to consider when examining these two channels of integration? In this paper, we will examine these and other questions in detail. Furthermore, given that East Asia and Latin America are two fertile territories in which various forms of PTAs proliferate, we will use the experiences of these two regions extensively as useful illustrations for our work in this paper.
To look ahead, using the experiences of East Asia and Latin America as our guide, our research on the topic of integration of markets vs. integration by agreements suggests four conclusions. First, until fairly recently (say the late 1990s), East Asian countries have integrated among themselves primarily via the markets and not by formal, de jure trade agreements. In contrast, Latin America has a long history (since the 1960s) of legal trade treaties that attempt to bind themselves together. Second, using various indicators of trade and economic integration, it is clear that East Asian economies are much more integrated among themselves than the economies of Latin America. At least for the important cases of East Asia and Latin America, integration using the marketplace or via de facto agreements (together with business-friendly policies by individual countries) leads to more intense integration than de jure agreements. Third, from the viewpoint of policymakers who want to strengthen trade relationships regionally, this suggests that the proper sequencing of the two forms of integration should first be the freeing of the domestic private sectors which allow them to mature and to use the international markets to integrate, before establishing legal treaties to further deepen the relationships. Lastly, from a political-economic standpoint, it can be seen from the examples in East Asia and Latin America that regional trade agreements often serve several constituents. Trade agreements are both economic agreements as well as foreign policy agreements. Regional trade agreements can also be inward-looking or outward-oriented. To keep the primary focus on the open-trade and economic objectives, it is thus important to first develop a thick market for exporters and traders, who can pressure the government to pay attention to the signals of the economic forces. We will use a generalized Nash bargaining analysis to illustrate this point. In the next section, we provide a detailed overview of recent development of regional trade agreements in East Asia and in Latin America. In section 3, we provide some information of the extent and characteristics of the trade integration in these two regions. In section 4, we provide a simple analysis of trade policy implementation that illustrates how integration of markets first can lead to more successful trade connections than integration via trade agreements. In section 5, we conclude.
Regional Trade Agreements in East Asia and Latin America
In the wake of the progress achieved in Europe and North America, regional cooperation has recently gained momentum all over the world. Regional cooperation is of course not an end in itself but has to be considered as a way of enhancing economic growth and development. Most of the industrial and developing countries have concluded some regional trade and investment agreements.
Compared to other international regions, for instance Latin America, Asia lagged in concluding formal trade agreements as East Asian countries have been more supportive of an open multilateral system. The Asian regional integration can be regarded as a de facto regional integration even though recently, by the end of 1990s, most East Asian countries have showed strong interest about de jure regionalism. However, the momentum for formal regional integration has been accompanied by the proliferation of bilateral FTAs not only within Asia but also with extra-regional countries, in particular with Latin America.
Latin American countries adopted formal/de jure regional integration in the early 1990s, such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR, but in addition to these sub-regional schemes, various bilateral FTAs have emerged both among Latin American countries and with the extra-regional countries by the end of 1990s.
It is noteworthy that, given different choices of regional integration, intra-regional trade in Latin America is much less than that of East Asian countries. We will highlight this contrast of trade integration in section 3. First let us next discuss the recent history of free trade agreements in East Asia and Latin America.
Trends of Free Trade Areas in East Asia
It is generally recognized that the FTA of ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries signed in 1992 was the starting point of East Asian regionalism.
However, in the Asia-Pacific region, regional cooperation took shape as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic cooperation) at the end of the 1980s. APEC 1 is not a regional trade agreement, but a unique form of economic cooperation for promoting trade and investment liberalization, economic and technical cooperation among Asia-Pacific countries. Although APEC is not an FTA in legal terms, it has a plan to achieve free trade in the region. At the APEC Summit
Meeting in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, the leaders adopted the "Bogor goal", where they announced their commitment to complete trade and investment liberalization by 2010 in the case of industrial country members and by 2020 in the case of developing country members.
At Osaka in November 1995, an agreement was reached on a set of fundamental principles to bring about the liberalization of trade and investment. If the "Bogor goals" are realized and the commitments of the member countries are fully implemented, APEC countries can enjoy a substantial welfare improvement through free trade opportunities in the region, without creating formal trade agreements. APEC adopted an "open regionalism" as the underlying paradigm i.e. with the intention of sharing benefits of free trade with non-members and thus trying to comply with the most favored nation (MFN) principal of the WTO. The work of APEC in trade liberalization did not achieve much success. However, it should not be viewed as a failure of "open regionalism", but rather the result of the diversification of the APEC agenda, which now includes such topics as anti-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
In the late 1990s, Asian economies appeared to seek another path for regional Table 1 gives an overview of the intra-regional and extra-regional arrangements in East Asia.
These are manifestations of a real willingness in East Asia toward closer regional cooperation. While ASEAN is often presumed to be the most important economic cooperation in the region, its impact on promoting intra-regional trade and investment has been limited.
The initiation of FTAs was soon followed by the 1997 financial crisis affecting the region.
Since then, paradoxically, the regional financial proposals are moving faster than any serious 
Origins of the New Asian Regionalism
Before 1997, most Asian economists considered East Asian economic cooperation (through trade and investment) as an example of a successful de facto regionalism i.e.
explained by the play of pure economic forces. However, the financial crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated the weaknesses of informal regional cooperation and gave East Asians a strong impetus to search for a regional mechanism that could forestall future crisis. This search is now gathering momentum and opening the door to possibly significant de jure integration in East Asia.
The Asian financial crisis is often regarded as the outbreak for the rise in regionalism Once traditional barriers to trade and investment are eliminated, there are still many other impediments to abolish. The regional integration is in fact a result of economic forces and political willingness. In the case of East Asia, political issues have long been major obstacles to regional economic cooperation. Nonetheless, prospect for de jure regionalism in East Asia is not totally disappeared as new approaches and initiatives are in recent times put forward by the regional states. East Asian regionalism is undergoing a phase of new interpretation. It is no longer limited in an economic sense. Growing interdependence and tightening financial links are not sufficient to make this regionalization more consistent: strategic thinking is being inserted as the concept of regionalism begins to expand in terms of both geography and agenda 6 .
Trends of Free Trade Areas in Latin America
Free trade is not a new concept in Latin America. Globally, we can consider three phases of FTA process in Latin America. Sources: WTO web data and various info from the web.
Driving forces of the recent development of regionalism in Latin America
The development of regionalism in Latin America in the 1990s can be explained by several factors (Hosono, A., Nishijima S., 2003) . The most significant ones are the following:
-Economic liberalization of the 1980s: Latin American countries started radical policy reforms in the middle of the 1980s, leaving behind interventionist policies responsible for economic crises in the 1980s. Upshots of these policy reforms were seen mostly in the trade and capital liberalization.
-Increasing regionalism of the US: The US foreign trade policy had been based on a mix of multilateralism and bilateralism until the end of the 1980s. From then on, the US showed an inclination towards regionalism with the formation of NAFTA and APEC. In response to these changes in the US attitude towards regionalism, Latin
American countries adopted different behaviors:
• Some countries expressed strong impetus about joining FTA of Americas, on the US initiative and leadership;
• Other countries, such as Chile, started a negotiation to join NAFTA;
• Southern Cone countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, formed a sub-regional integration i.e. MERCOSUR, to counterbalance against the regionalism of the US; • Mexico and Chile enhanced bilateral intra and extra-regional FTAs;
• 
Characteristics and Intensity of Trade Integration in East Asia and Latin America
In this section we will examine the characteristics and intensity of regional trade integration in both East Asia and Latin America. Thus one can surmise that de facto trade agreements or integration via the markets were effective in helping East Asia integrate, while de jure trade agreements do not seem to lead to more intra-regional trade integration in Latin America.
Generally one may surmise that trade integration may tend to occur to a greater extent for manufactured goods. Furthermore, given the rising importance of trade in components and parts, it is expected that integration via trade in components and parts should be even more intense (Yi, 2003; Ng and Yeats, 2003) . Global and regional production sharing and vertical specialization have become increasingly important. In the next Table we wish to highlight intra-regional trade of manufactured goods and components and parts within these two regions for various years. Another way we can analyze the intensity of regional trade integration is through the use of the trade intensity index. The trade intensity index is defined as:
where X ij and X wj are country i and world exports to country j; X i and X w are country i and world total exports. The numerator indicates the share of country i's export to country j in total export of the country i, and the denominator indicates the share of world's export to country j in its total export. If the bilateral trade intensity index has a value greater than one, the export of country i outperforms in country j. It implies that country j is relatively important to country i's exports.
In Table 5 , we present calculations of the trade intensity indices for East Asian countries as well as some of their major trading partners for 2005. To further highlight their trade relationship, we also provide the overall trade matrix for the region. The overall East
Asia-East Asia trade index is 5.9, as compared to the Latin American (LAIA) trade index of 3.6 (Table 6 ). For an in-depth analysis, we compare ASEAN index to ANDEAN and MERCOSUR countries. The ASEAN index is 7.2 while the indices for ANDEAN and MECOSUR are respectively 13.5 and 12.6. These results show highlight that trade integration is higher among Latin American countries participating to regional agreements. However, the regional point of view highlights a more pronounced integration in East Asia (5.9), with more recent and less regional trade agreements, compared to Latin America, including the United States and Canada (5.0). Yet another way to examine the characteristics of recent regional trade agreements is to note that one of the important motives of the so-called "New Regionalism", particularly for smaller economies, is to design rules to attract more foreign direct investment and to strengthen institutions in order to participate in global and regional production sharing (Ethier 1998 , Salazar-Xirinachs 2005 . where j indicates the product value and k home country. X jk and X wk represent the product value of j exported by country k and the world; X k and X w are total exports of j by country k and the world. If the index has a value greater than one, country k has a comparative advantage in the production of product j. If the index has a value smaller than one, the industry of the country has a comparative disadvantage.
Suppose we go further and differentiate the RCA index for exports from that for imports. When the RCA index is greater than 1 for exports of components and parts, 8 we can reasonably argue that the economy has a comparative advantage in "processing". When the RCA index is greater than 1 for imports, we say that the economy has comparative advantage in "assembly". The RCA indices for East Asian and Latin American imports and exports of parts and components for various years are shown in Table 7 and Table 8 . From Table 7 , it is clear that East Asian revealed comparative advantage in processed exports of components and parts has been gaining over the years, starting way back from 1985. The percentage of products that the East Asian economies have comparative advantage in assembly has declined over time. The results for Latin America are given in Table 8 . agreements (Sapir 1998 , Mavroidis 2005 . Japan now has several formal bilateral trade agreements, including agreements with Singapore, Mexico and Malaysia.
According to Aoki (1988) , policy implementation and formulation (including trade policies) in Japan can be seen as a bargaining of the various Ministries. Furthermore, certain bureaus of each Ministry (genkyoku) maintain contact with their constituents and the Ministry can be understood to be maximizing a weighted sum of the interests of its constituents as well as the national interest. The argument for this view is that when the bureaucrats from each Ministry retire, they often will "descend from the heaven" (amakudari) and obtain high positions in the private sector, usually in the constituents' industries. While this aspect of industry-government linkage has been weakened in recent years, nonetheless it still exists and is a strong reason for the Ministries to pay attention to the interests of their constituents. At the same time, each Ministry cannot stray too often and too far from the national interest or it risks the loss of reputation within the government and among the public. Generally MOFA can be viewed as paying particular attention to the diplomatic and security interests of Japan, while METI is viewed as paying special attention to the economic and international trade interests of the country. The implicit bargaining of these two Ministries, together with the participation and coordination of other government entities, will decide how trade policies and regional trade agreements will be implemented.
To simplify our analysis, suppose trade policy formulation is represented in a model of generalized Nash bargaining game. The policymaker is the Nashian arbitrator maximizing a weighted sum of the economic and foreign policy interests (the interests of MOFA and METI, respectively). We further assume for simplicity the overall national interests can be subsumed within the economic and the foreign policy objectives. Then we can write down the maximization of the national objective N of a country, say Japan, is:
where N is the national objective, E represents the economic interest, F is the foreign policy goal, a is the bargaining power of the economic interest (as ultimately represented in the implementation of the regional trade agreement by economic agents such as traders, exporters, retailers which import cheaper import goods, etc), and b is the bargaining power of the foreign policy establishments. E 0 and F 0 are the respective threat points of the economic and foreign policy interests. There may be a formally agreed (via a de jure trade treaty) trade instrument T, but the effective trade policy to be implemented in each country is actually t, the policy instrument to be bargained by various groups within each country. This can be something transparent such as foreign investment policy or a more opaque instrument such as a trade facilitation policy (custom procedure, technical standards, etc.).
We can further assume that within the economic interests, the interests of trade agreement implementations can be divided into two camps: the interests of the inwardlooking group M and the interests of the outward-looking group X. The three parties form the negotiated national objective function of:
where M 0 and X 0 are the respective threat points for the inward-looking group and the outward-looking group. For example, in the earlier periods, when Japan's METI was Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the powerful agency that was focused on industrial policy implementations, the outward-looking economic interests can be interpreted as the interests of the exporters, while the inward-looking economic interests represent the constituents who wanted to restrict imports and restrict inward direct investment (Noland and Pack 2003) . All the interests of the parties are related to the effectively implemented trade policy instrument t. It is assumed that M increases with an increase in t (i.e. the interests of the inward-looking group rise with a rise in protection). X decreases with a rise in protection, while F can vary for a country located in different regions at different periods. In East Asia, foreign policy interests tend to be more pro-trade, so there is a sense that F rises with a lower t. In other cases, a component of foreign policy may be to go against open trade, particularly U.S.-led regional trade agreements. In that case, F rises with an increase in protection, at least for some range of t.
In essence, we assume that if there is a formal regional trade contract which establishes the formal trade policy instrument T, it is an incomplete contract. An incomplete trade contract is one where it cannot specify all contingencies. Regional trade dispute settlement can help, but even there the process is slow and can be inconsistent. Thus national governments have the leeway to implement trade instruments to various degrees of openness.
In effect, we assume that the implemented trade policy, t, can be higher or lower. The implementation process is decided by internal bargaining of various groups within the country.
As is well-known the generalized Nash bargaining formulation can be mathematically derived from a more detailed bargaining process (Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986) . The bargaining power of each party depends on how patient the party is able to be while waiting out an impasse, how averse the party is to the risk of a collapse of an agreement and what alternative is available to the party in the event that the bargaining breaks down. Given that East Asia already has a deep degree of trade integration via the market, we can argue that the bargaining power of the outward-oriented group is high. Furthermore, given that the foreign policy establishments in East Asia tend to be pro-exports (as e.g. under MOFA), an active role played by the foreign policy interests will tend to coincide with the outward-oriented interests. Assuming that we have an unique maximum for N and that t* In internal deliberations concerning how the trade agreement should be implemented, the various parties attempt to reach an agreement. These three sets of interests may go against each other and the internal equilibrium may break down. The threat points and the bargaining power of each party will determine which direction the implementation of the regional trade agreement may go. 9 For example, it may be to the nation's outward-oriented economic advantage to be welcoming foreign direct investment. However to the inward-looking group and to some foreign policy analysts, this may represent a loss of influence and sovereignty.
Even for the case of Japan, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment is effectively a relatively recent event (Noland and Pack 2003) .
If the economy is already fairly integrated with other regional trading partners via the market first, there is a thick group of outward-looking economic interests (such as exporters, traders, shippers, etc) that may raise the bargaining power of the outward-looking open-trade economic constituency (an increase in ax). This will tilt the implementation of the trade agreement in favor of pursuing further liberalization in response to the correct market signal.
If however, there is only limited market integration and the inward-looking and certain types of foreign policy interests dominate (an increase in am and an increase in b of the protectionist foreign policy interests), then the regional agreement will in actually not be implemented for economic integration. Instead it will be used mainly as a tool for importsubstitution and nationalistic foreign policy objectives. This simple analysis can thus be used to highlight why developing first a network of traders and exporters may help generate a more outward-looking economically friendly outcome. 10 This may help explain why by integrating via markets and by pursuing policies that are generally business-friendly and foreign direct investment-friendly (even though formal regional trade agreements had been absent), East and Southeast Asia has been able to generate a deeper degree of regional integration in practice.
Our result from this section can be summarized as: 10 A much more familiar argument for having a formal trade agreement when there is already substantially a lot of trade is that this is less likely to generate trade diversion. For details, see e.g. Winters (1999) .
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the two channels of regional integration: integration of markets vs. integration by agreements. Since East Asia and Latin America are two regions where preferential trade agreements have proliferated in recent years, we utilize the experiences of these two areas to illustrate our results. We have four related results in this paper. First, East Asia started their integration by primarily using the markets, then by the 1990s, the region started to turn to more formal agreements. Complementary policies in the drive for integration via the markets include business-friendly and FDI-friendly policies as well as domestic policies such as improvement of the infrastructure. Latin America, on the other hand, has relied mainly on formal, de jure regional agreements for integration. Second, using a variety of indicators, it seems that at least in terms of the extent of intra-regional integrations and in terms of advancing comparative advantage in the processing of components and parts, East and Southeast Asia has been more successful. Third, if the main objective is regional trade integration, then it seems that the proper sequencing of the two forms of integration is first to develop integration via the markets before engaging in more formal agreements. Lastly, an argument in favor of this sequence is that by developing the lobbying clout of the outward-looking economic and trade interests first, this will enhance the internal bargaining power of the outward-oriented constituency in the internal bargaining of trade policy, thereby tilting the implementation of the regional trade agreement to be more in line with the market signals.
